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Indirect Measures in Evaluation:  
On Not Knowing What We Don’t Know  
 
Linda Heath, Adam DeHoek, & Sara House Locatelli,  
Loyola University Chicago 
 
Evaluators frequently make use of indirect measures of participant learning or skill mastery, with participants 
either being asked if they have learned material or mastered a skill or being asked to indicate how confident 
they are that they know the material or can perform the task in question. Unfortunately, myriad research in 
social psychology has demonstrated that people are very poor judges of their own levels of accomplishment. 
In this paper, the social psychological dynamics that contribute to biased self-assessments are overviewed. 
These include the self-serving bias (e.g., Miller & Ross, 1975), the better-than-average effect (e.g., Alicke et al., 
1995; Brown, 1986), and the overconfidence phenomenon (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Methods of 
correcting these biased reports are generally ineffective, as illustrated by Kruger and Dunning’s (1999) 
findings that people lowest in mastery generally lack the metacognition even to understand what mastery 
looks like. As this type of person learns the skill in question, they often realize the level of their ignorance and 
lower their self-reported knowledge and skill levels. Although indirect measures of participant learning or 
mastery might tell us something about the level of confidence of the participants, they probably tell us little 
about actual ability or knowledge. Implications for applied research are discussed. 
 
Many, if not most, interventions involve teaching 
someone something, whether it is teaching women in 
developing countries how to run their own businesses, 
teaching high school freshmen how to perform CPR, or 
even teaching teachers how to teach. This newly learned 
knowledge or skill will then presumably lead to more 
income and better living conditions, more lives saved, or 
better student learning. Linking the learning to the 
ultimate outcome, however, is not simple. For example, 
if students do poorly on tests, it might be that the 
teachers had not mastered the new skills or that the 
students were unmotivated or too stressed to learn. As 
plentiful as the complications are that intervene between 
the program and the ultimate outcome, however, 
evaluators realize that without actual knowledge or skill 
mastery in the first place, the intended downstream 
effects will never occur. Further, if evaluators cannot 
document that the knowledge or skill mastery took place, 
the staff of a failed program cannot know where the 
critical problems in the intervention reside, hindering 
further program refinement. Clearly, evaluating the 
extent of knowledge or skill mastery is critical not only 
for summative (or final assessment) evaluations, but also 
for formative (or developmental) evaluations. 
Use of indirect measures  
Because direct evaluations of knowledge and skill 
mastery are not simple to conduct for practical and 
sometimes legal or ethical reasons, evaluators often make 
use of indirect, rather than direct, measures of learning. 
Such indirect measures are seen as useful by many 
teachers (Noonan & Duncan, 2005) and display 
consistent patterns among participants, though much 
weaker relationships to teacher assessments (Ross, 2006). 
Participants self-report how much they have learned, 
how confident they are they have mastered the skill, or 
how comfortable they feel with the skill or domain. This 
approach is based on the assumption that people can 
accurately judge their own abilities and knowledge-levels. 
Such indirect measures of knowledge and skill attainment 
are presumed to be a solution to the problems that direct 
measurement present. Unfortunately, such a move is 
going from the proverbial frying pan into the fire, as 
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indirect measures of learning are replete with their own 
problems.  
This article overviews the factors that compromise 
the validity of indirect measures in applied settings. 
Research on these factors (e.g., Kruger & Dunning, 1999, 
2002), as well as criticisms of such research (e.g., Krueger 
& Mueller, 2002)  are published primarily in psychology 
journals, making these issues less well-known to 
evaluators and others who often use such indirect 
assessments in applied settings. The implications of this 
body of research for applied research are examined here. 
Among the many factors that can influence the validity 
of indirect measures of student learning, two are 
particularly problematic. First, most assessments of 
learning, but particularly those in areas that do not 
provide immediate, irrefutable feedback concerning 
success or failure, are prone to numerous distortions that 
are well-documented in psychology, such as the self-
serving bias (e.g., Miller & Ross, 1975), the better-than-
average effect (e.g., Alicke, Klotz, Breitenbecher, Yurak, 
& Vredenburg, 1995; Brown, 1986), and the 
overconfidence phenomenon (Tversky & Kahneman, 
1979). Second, and perhaps the more serious problem, 
research by Kruger and Dunning (1999, 2002) has shown 
that people at the lowest levels of actual mastery lack the 
metacognitive understanding of what mastery even is, 
leading them to wildly over-estimate their own skills, 
often believing themselves to be above average. Each of 
these problems with indirect assessments of mastering 
knowledge and skills will be discussed in turn. 
Social Psychological explanations for 
biased self-evaluation in applied settings 
Dunning, Heath, and Suls (2004) have described 
how and why these errors occur in areas ranging from 
health, to education, to the workplace. In that 
monograph they also document the lack of 
correspondence between people’s self-assessments and 
the assessments of others, such as doctors or teachers, as 
well as the lack of congruence between people’s self-
assessments and their objective performance.  
In the education area, accurate assessment of how 
much you have learned and what skills you really have 
would obviously be useful for determining how much to 
study, which advanced classes to take, and when to feel 
confident in performing a new task. Although the 
relationship between self-assessment of skills or 
knowledge and the objective level of that skill or 
knowledge is not zero, it is, in the words of Dunning, et 
al. (2004) “meager to modest” (p. 85). For example, 
people’s estimates of their own IQ’s correlate between .2 
and .3 with their actual performance on IQ tests. Meta-
analyses of the relationship between self-assessment and 
objective performance find correlations ranging from .21 
to .39 (Dunning, et al., 2004). On the bright side, the 
correlation between students’ assessments of their 
learning in classes and teachers’ assessments of their 
learning does tend to increase from introductory to more 
advanced classes. Before becoming too excited, however, 
it must be noted that undergraduate pre-medical 
students’ self-assessments’ correlations with ratings of 
their own abilities and knowledge by teachers or 
supervisors actually got lower as time went on, with the 
students’ final self-assessments of knowledge not 
correlating at all with their medical school board scores. 
The major social psychological phenomenon at 
work in biased self-evaluation is the self-serving bias 
(e.g., Miller & Ross, 1975). This is the tendency for 
individuals to accept personal responsibility for success, 
while failing to take such responsibility for failure. This 
bias has been explained through both motivational and 
cognitive means. It is generally held that individuals have 
a desire for self-enhancement through both positive self-
presentation and self-esteem maintenance. In times of 
success as well as in times of failure, individuals look for 
ways to present themselves positively to others. In cases 
of success, individuals may choose to publicly enhance 
their achievements, alerting others to the fact that they 
have succeeded; on the other hand, it is also possible that 
these individuals will downplay their achievements, if 
modesty is in order. Privately, people are likely to 
enhance their accomplishments, thus allowing 
themselves to maintain a high level of self-esteem. In 
cases of failure, individuals may publicly shun 
responsibility for an action, blaming others or the 
situation rather than themselves, if this course of action 
is likely to be perceived more positively by others. 
However, they may accept some of the blame for failure 
if humility will place them in a better light. In private, it is 
likely that individuals will blame the situation or others in 
order to maintain their own self-esteem. Thus, in both 
success and failure, individuals are able to present 
themselves positively. In addition, they are able to 
maintain the most positive self-esteem. In this way, 
people can experience self-enhancement both publicly 
and privately. 
Just as the self-serving bias affects the responsibility 
that people take for a given outcome, it also affects the 
evaluation of one’s own actions following both success 
and failure. Primarily, individuals are more likely to 
accept responsibility for expected outcomes rather than 
unexpected outcomes. Because individuals often intend 
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to and believe that they will succeed, people most often 
expect positive outcomes. In addition, people believe 
that they have more control over outcomes that they 
expect. Therefore, when individuals succeed, be it as 
students on an exam or investors on the stock market, 
they are likely to view this success as driven by their own 
efforts and talents, rather than merely the result of the 
situation. Research has shown that unexpected 
outcomes—be they positive or negative—will likely be 
attributed to external forces. As negative outcomes are 
often unexpected, these outcomes will more often be 
attributed to something outside of the individual and out 
of one’s control. Therefore, when individuals fail, they 
will likely see this failure as the result of something that 
someone else did or did not do, or of the situation itself, 
rather than reflective of the self. Thus, using the same 
examples as those above, if students fail an exam, or 
brokers lose a significant amount of money, they are 
likely to perceive this as outside of their control. When it 
comes to self-evaluation, individuals are unlikely to 
recognize the true source of the outcomes in both 
successes and failures. Because of this, they are also 
unlikely to be able to effectively monitor how successful 
they would be at demonstrating the skills they believe 
they have mastered. 
People also demonstrate self-serving effects and 
biased self-evaluation via a psychological phenomenon 
known as the better-than-average effect (e.g., Alicke et 
al., 1995; Brown, 1986). This phenomenon suggests that 
people believe that they possess positive traits to a 
greater degree and negative traits to a lesser degree than 
does the average person. Similarly, individuals believe 
that they know more and perform better on certain tasks 
than the average person. Therefore, if individuals rated 
their own abilities to complete specific tasks 
successfully—be it how effective they are at writing a 
paper or predicting changes in the stock market—they 
would likely state that they were better than the average 
person at such tasks. This effect is particularly 
pronounced when the comparison target is 
nonindividuated, such as "the average college student”. 
In addition, College Board studies found that 60% of 
high school seniors rated themselves in the top 10% in 
terms of “ability to get along with others,” and 25% rated 
themselves in the top 1% on this ability. The effect does 
not only hold for students. Ninety-four percent of 
college professors claim to do above-average work 
(Cross, 1977). 
Finally, Tversky and Kahneman (1979) 
demonstrated an over-confidence phenomenon, whereby 
people’s confidence in their assessments is non-
significantly related to their accuracy. Clearly, we don’t 
know what we know, but we are confident we do. This 
phenomenon exacerbates the biases discussed above. 
Not only are we wrong, but we are quite confident we 
are right!  
Attempts to increase the  
validity of biased self-evaluations 
Unfortunately, remedying the problem of biased 
self-evaluation is not simply a matter of giving clearer 
feedback and more practice making these self-
assessments for students to get it right. A study by 
Hacker, Bol, Horgan, and Rakow (2000) showed that 
higher performing students did get better able to predict 
their exam grades as the semester wore on, but poorly 
performing students continued to wildly over-estimate 
their performance, being not at all fazed by their 
repeated failures to achieve those high scores they had 
previously predicted. 
So what’s going on? Is it that students just don’t 
know how to assess performance? No, because they do 
pretty well when assessing other students’ performance. 
A meta-analysis found that the correlation between 
assessments of a peer and teachers’ assessments averaged 
.72. So it seems to be something about assessing one’s 
self that leads people astray.  
One factor that contributes to erroneous self-
assessments, as mentioned before, is that for many types 
of learning, there is not immediate, irrefutable feedback 
concerning mastery of a skill or knowledge area. For 
some learning outcomes (e.g., learning to do a triple-
backflip, learning to insert an IV needle, being 
conversant in a foreign language with native speakers of 
that language), students can receive immediate, 
irrefutable feedback and clearly know if they have failed 
to master the skill. They fall on their heads, the patient 
screams in pain and no medicine flows through the IV, 
or the native speaker looks at the student in total 
incomprehension. An indirect measure of this type of 
learning outcome (e.g., “How confident are you in your 
ability to perform a triple-backflip?”) might lead the 
student to ponder “Well, the last five times I tried it I 
landed on my head, so I guess I’m not very good at it.” 
Nevertheless, motivational biases and selective recall 
could still lead to answers that are a bit more positive 
than the number of head-landings would warrant. This 
said, the measure could still be useable, given that its 
imperfections are recognized. 
When we enter the realm of most student learning 
outcome assessments, however, we leave immediate, 
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irrefutable feedback behind. “How confident are you in 
your understanding of the causes of the Civil War;” 
“how confident are you in your ability to write a 
grammatically correct essay,” and “how well do you 
understand the auditory system” all lack the immediate 
bump on the head or screaming patient of the previous 
examples. Students might factor in their course grades as 
proxies for their mastery, but that still leaves ample room 
for motivational biases, selective recall, and other 
psychological factors to distort their responses.  
One clue that psychological factors are distorting 
self-assessments is the fact that self-assessments are 
overwhelmingly more positive than warranted. If people 
were just really bad at judging their own abilities and 
levels of knowledge, without a psychologically motivated 
component, we would expect their self-assessments to 
form a normal distribution around the actual ability level. 
Some people (or all people some of the time) would 
wildly over-estimate their abilities, and some people (or 
all people some of the time) would wildly under-estimate 
their abilities. Consequently, the average would hover 
pretty near the actual ability level. This is, in fact, the 
pattern we see when people are assessing peers’ 
performance. But that pattern doesn’t appear with self-
assessments. Most people assess themselves as being 
“above average” on any given task, sort of the Lake 
Wobegon Effect. There is a rosy glow that surrounds our 
self-estimates. (To be thorough, it should be noted that 
very high-achieving people initially under-estimate their 
own percentile ranking on various skills. They fail to 
recognize not necessarily how good they are, but how 
bad most other people are. After feedback about their 
performance, however, high-performing people begin to 
give more accurate self-assessments (Kruger & Dunning, 
1999).) 
If the only problems with indirect measures of 
student learning were ones that resulted in an inflation of 
actual learning, these measures could be made useful by 
simply applying a correction factor, making program 
comparisons using the same distorted measure. So if 
Psychology majors reported mean confidence of 8 and 
English majors reported mean confidence of 6, if the 
only factors distorting the reports were creating main 
effects of rosy-glow, an administrator could conclude 
that the Psychology program was doing a better job than 
the English program at meeting learning outcomes, even 
though the actual achievement was probably lower than 
the 8 and the 6 would imply. 
However, there is an issue underlying self-
evaluation that makes applying this correction 
impossible. This is the discrepancy between knowledge 
and awareness of knowledge. While it is true that people 
are often aware of the things that they know, it is equally 
likely if not more common that they are unaware of what 
they do not know. Kruger and Dunning (1999) have 
discussed the topic of the interaction between knowledge 
and the awareness of knowledge. They claim that people 
who are deficient at a task are doubly disabled. Primarily, 
they do not know how to perform the task at hand. 
Secondly, although not of lesser importance, these 
individuals do not realize that they are not successful at 
completing the task. This phenomenon shows itself 
through indirect measures of learning. Individuals at the 
lowest levels of mastery inflate their abilities most and 
those at the highest levels of mastery actually understate 
their abilities. Kruger and Dunning (1999) showed this 
pattern of the least competent being least able to assess 
their own competence across judgments ranging from 
ability to judge funniness of jokes to grammatical skills to 
logic abilities. In all cases, participants whose abilities 
were objectively in the lowest quartile overrated their 
own abilities and often considered themselves to be 
above average. Kruger and Dunning argued that those in 
the lowest quartile lack the meta-cognitive ability to 
understand what “good performance” looks like, and are 
thus unable to recognize their own mistakes as failures. 
Kruger and Dunning showed that giving the students 
feedback about how well others had performed did not 
lower their ratings of their own abilities (although this 
feedback did cause students in the top-quartile to 
increase their ratings of their own ability more in line 
with their actual ability).  
Remedies 
The only way Kruger and Dunning found to 
increase the accuracy of the ratings of students from the 
lowest quartile was to teach them the skill in question. 
Once they had been trained on what that skill actually 
involved, they reported that their own skill level was 
lower than they had reported it prior to such training. So, 
paradoxically, once participants had some clue about 
what the skill actually involved, they lowered their ratings 
of their own ability. Applying this finding, a professor 
who succeeds in teaching students the actual skills 
involved in the learning outcomes might be met with 
lower mean self-assessments of achievement from 
students, as the students in the lowest quartile come to 
report their ability more accurately. 
As any professor knows who has heard students 
swear they know the material backward and forward, 
only to next hear them claim the retina is in the middle 
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ear, students often persist in believing they have 
mastered material even in the face of exam scores to the 
contrary. How many students have argued (to no avail) 
that they totally understand the material but the test 
didn’t measure their knowledge correctly, or they know 
the material but they just couldn’t produce it at the time 
of the test, or, nearer the end of the meeting with the 
professor, maybe they didn’t know the material on the 
last test, but they certainly will know it now? If Kruger 
and Dunning are correct, these students don’t even know 
what “knowing the material” is, let alone how to get 
there. 
The realization that self-assessments generally do 
not accurately reflect actual learning or mastery leads to 
the inevitable conclusion that real program effects 
cannot be known with any certainty through indirect 
measures of learning or accomplishment. Although self-
assessments might be useful for motivating students or 
measuring perceived learning, they do not measure actual 
learning. Real learning can only be assessed via direct 
measures of the skill or knowledge that was meant to be 
learned. Direct assessments are often difficult to do, 
time-consuming, expensive, and fraught with attrition 
and other practical problems. How do researchers 
convince teachers who are racing to cover all the material 
that time is needed for direct measures of learning? Who 
funds the long-term follow-up, years after the program 
(and likely the mandate that funded it) has ended? How 
can researchers gain cooperation from administrators 
who were not involved with the original study? Solutions 
to these problems need to be built into the original 
research design and contract. Efforts to educate funders 
and consumers of research about the limitations of 
indirect measures are necessary to ensure that direct 
measures are properly understood and valued. 
In summary, to build evaluations on indirect 
measures of what participants report they have learned 
or mastered is to risk untold confusion and inaccurate 
conclusions. Programs that succeed in teaching the 
participants to assess their own performance accurately 
would fare very poorly in comparison with programs that 
let natural biases bloom, and programs that could reach 
the participants at the bottom of the ability distribution 
and teach them what mastery looks like would fare least 
well of all, as the participants might then accurately 
report that they actually have not mastered the material. 
Indirect measures based on what participants think they 
have learned or how confident they are in their abilities 
are not totally useless. For example, they can tell us if the 
students happily think they are wizards at statistical 
analysis or understanding the Civil War or writing essays. 
They just don’t tell us if those confident students think 
the retina is in the ear. To borrow a term from the 
introduction to the Dunning, Heath, and Suls 
monograph, we won’t know if the participants have 
actually learned or if they are just “blissfully 
incompetent.”  
References 
Alicke, M.D., Klotz, M.I., Breitenbecher, D.I., Yurak, 
T.J., & Vredenburg, D.S. (1995). Personal contact, 
individuation and the better-than-average effect. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 68, 
804 – 825. 
Brown, J.D. (1986). Evaluations of self and others: Self-
enhancement biases in social judgments. Social 
Cognition, 4, 353-376. 
Cross, P. (1977). Not can but will college teaching be 
improved? New Directions for Higher Education, 
17, 1-15. 
Dunning, D., Heath, C. & Suls, J. (2004). Flawed self-
assessment: Implications for health, education, and 
the workplace. Psychological Science in the Public 
Interest, 5, 71 – 106. 
Hacker, D.J., Bol, L., Horgan, D., & Rakow, E. (2000). 
Test prediction and performance in a classroom 
context. Journal of Educational Psychology, 92, 160 
– 170. 
Kahneman, D. & Tversky, A. (1979). Intuitive 
prediction: Biases and corrective procedures. 
Management Science, 12, 313-327. 
Krueger, J. (1998). On the perception of social 
consensus. Advances in Experimental Social 
Psychology, 30, 163-240. 
Krueger, J. & Mueller, R.A. (2002). Unskilled, unaware, 
or both? The contribution of social – perceptual 
skills and statistical regression to self-enhancement 
biases. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 
82, 180-188. 
Kruger, J. (1999). Lake Wobegon be gone! The "below-
average effect" and the egocentric nature of 
comparative ability judgments. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 77, 221 - 232. 
Kruger, J. & Dunning, D. (1999). Unskilled and unaware 
of it: How difficulties in recognizing one’s own 
incompetence lead to inflated self-assessments. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 77, 
1121-1134. 
Kruger, J. & Dunning, D. (2002). Unskilled and 
unaware—but why? A reply to Krueger and Mueller 
5
Heath et al.: Indirect Measures In Evaluation: On Not Knowing What We Don’t Kno
Published by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst, 2012
Practical Assessment, Research & Evaluation, Vol 17, No 6 Page 6 
Heath, DeHoek, & Locatelli, Indirect Measures in Evaluation 
 
(2002). Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 82, 189 – 192. 
Miller, D.T. & Ross, M. (1975). Self-serving biases in the 
attribution of causality: Fact or fiction? 
Psychological Bulletin, 82, 213-225.  
Noonan, B. & Duncan, C.R. (2005). Peer and self-
assessment in high schools. Practical Assessment, 
Research & Evaluation, 10 (17). 
Ross, J.A. (2006). The reliability, validity, and utility of 
self-assessment. Practical Assessment, Research & 
Evaluation, 11(10).   
 
 
Citation: 
Heath, Linda,  DeHoek, Adam & Locatelli, Sara House (2012). Indirect Measures In Evaluation: On Not Knowing What 
We Don’t Know. Practical Assessment, Research & Evaluation, 17(6). Available online: 
http://pareonline.net/getvn.asp?v=17&n=6 
 
Acknowledgements 
An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 2005 meetings of the American Evaluation Association. Portions of 
this work were supported by funds from the Illinois Mathematics and Science Partnership program which was funded by 
NCLB, Title II, Part B, U.S. Department of Education in FY 2007, David Slavsky, P.I., Grant # 14-016-9000-01-51. 
 
Authors: 
 
Linda Heath (Corresponding Author) 
Department of Psychology 
Loyola University Chicago 
1032 W. Sheridan Rd. 
Chicago, IL 60660 
LHeath [at] luc.edu
Adam DeHoek 
Department of Psychology 
Loyola University Chicago 
1032 W. Sheridan Rd. 
Chicago, IL 60660 
 
Sara House Locatelli 
Department of Psychology 
Loyola University Chicago 
1032 W. Sheridan Rd. 
Chicago, IL 60660 
 
6
Practical Assessment, Research, and Evaluation, Vol. 17 [2012], Art. 6
https://scholarworks.umass.edu/pare/vol17/iss1/6
DOI: https://doi.org/10.7275/00h8-7p49
